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FINITE FREEDOM, FRACTURED AND FRAGILE
KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGY AS RESOURCE
FOR A POSTMODERN THEOLOGY OF GRACE

I.

FRACTURED SITUATEDNESS

In laying out the conceptual topography of "the conflicts of modernity" at the conclusion of Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Charles Taylor notes "the crucial importance of the strands
of philosophy .,. which have been trying .. , to develop anthropologies
of situated freedom" 1. He considers development of such anthropologies
important for countering the ways in which contending strands of modem moral discourse and practice have constricted the range of goods that
humans may legitimately affIrm as morally compelling: These contending strands "find their way through the dilemmas of modernity by invalidating some of the goods in contest"2. In tandem with the case he
advances for developing "languages of personal resonance" to articulate
the legitimacy of the moral weight of these contested human goods, Taylor underwrites the need for "anthropologies of situated freedom" in
terms of a set of philosophical considerations about human self-identity
within which important theological subtexts about the relation of the
human to the divine may be discerned3 • In both cases, Taylor's engage1. Charles TAYLOR, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 514-515. Taylor does not offer a thematically focused treatment of "situated freedom" in Sources of the Self; his account relies
upon his previous discussion of this concept in Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1975, pp. 559-571; reproduced in Hegel and Modern Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 154-169.
2. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 503. A fundamental "zone of conflict" in which Taylor
sees each party contesting the validity of crucial ioods affirmed by the other is that
between "disengaged instrumentalism and the Romantic or modernist protest against it"
(Sources, p. 498). Some of the "contested goods" at issue playa constitutive role within
the contending strands, e.g., the instrumentalized ways of life on the side of the proponents of disengaged reason, self-exploration on the side of proponents of (subjective)
expressivism. Other "contested goods" are those overlooked by both parties in that zone
of conflict, "for instance, why it matters and what it means to have a more deeply resonant human environment and, even more, to have affiliations with some depth in time and
commitment" (Sources, p. 513).
3. See Philip ROSSI, Divine Transcendence and the Languages of Personal Resonance, in J. lIAERs - P. DE May (eds.), Theology and Conversation: Towards a Relational
Theology (BElL, 172), Leuven, Peeters, 2003, pp. 783-794,. for an exploration of the theological dimensions operative in his notion of "languages of personal resonance".
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ment with fundamental issues of human good - What constitutes genuine human good? What makes such good possible? What are the conditions for properly discerning it and for definitively attaining it? - occasionally takes note that such issues stand within a horizon of questions
of how the human stands in relation to the divine4 • Perhaps in view of an
audience perceived as willing to give hearing to philosophical modes of
discourse in his work, but wary of transpositions of such discourse into
theological modes, Taylor does not pursue these questions about human
good in an explicitly theological manner. Careful attention to certain
aspects of Taylor's treatment of these issues suggests, however, that his
brief notice of their theological dimensions is more than a polite bow in
the direction of the historical role that Christian thought once played in
framing them. Taylor's discussions also point to specific theological/oei
that continue to be pertinent to these issues. The one they point to most
insistently - and thus the one this essay explores - is that of "grace",
particularly as Christian traditions have forged it as an appropriate conceptuallocus for theological exploration of fundamental questions about
human good.
My goal in this essay is thus to lend theological support to Taylor's
philosophical case that we need "anthropologies of situated freedom" by
indicating how such anthropologies may serve as "prolegomena" for
theological understandings of grace appropriate to the fragmented cultures of meaning for which the term "post-modernity" often stands as
signpost. I will argue that framing an anthropology that is explicitly situated in reference to what Taylor terms "fractured horizons" of meaning
may prove useful in constructing a theology of grace properly attentive
to the fragmentation that deeply marks so many of the modes of human
life and meaning in which the exercise of human freedom is now
increasingly immersed. To provide an orientation to that horizon of fragmented meaning and the circumstances it encompasses, I will look principally to the work of Taylor and others who, while writing from a
stance often unflinchingly critical of key features of modernity, nonetheless can be considered neither '''boosters' nor 'knockers' who either
condemn or affIrm modernity en bloc"5. I consider their work to offer
particularly useful coordinates for situating us upon a terrain they all recognize as seriously fractured, and for which our human resources for
successful negotiation are slender and fragile - but upon which neither
4. See TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), pp. 410-413, for an instance in which he makes
explicit a connection these questions have to notions of grace.
5. Charles TAYLOR, A Catholic Modernity?, in James L. HEFT (ed.), Charles Taylor'S
Marianist Award Lecture, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 36.
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the fracturing of the terrain nor the fragility of our resources thereby
require us to abandon all hope for safe traverse. Within this context, I
will then propose some initial elements upon which to start construction
of an anthropology of appropriately situated freedom. I will suggest that
it may draw at least some elements from what may seem a surprising
source, inasmuch as that source provided, according to many standard
accounts of the emergence of modernity, a seminal delineation of the
very "unsituated" human freedom that played a pivotal role in the intellectual dynamics that brought about the fractured landscape of modernity. This source is an anthropology of free, finite human moral agency,
as it is both embedded in and articulated through the critical writings of
Immanuel Kant
Two major considerations lie behind my proposal to re-read Kant
against the grain of accounts - that start at least as far back as Hegel in which his formal rendering of freedom is understood as abstracting it
from every concrete human situs - and doing so precisely in order for
freedom to have the universality necessary for its moral purchase on
human action. In contrast to this thin, unpromising view of the anthropological locus of Kantian freedom, the first consideration in favor of a
new reading of Kant's anthropology arises in consequence of significantly different interpretive directions that Kant scholarship has been
exploring for at least two decades. These studies have been building a
case for understanding his philosophical rendering of human moral life
to include - and perhaps even to rest upon - a far more robust understanding of our human cosmic and social situatedness than has previously been recognized6 . In contrast, for instance, to an almost exclusive
stress on formal and deontological elements in Kant's account of the
maxims governing an individual agent's moral choice, more recent studies take note of Kant's placement of these accounts in texts that attend to
the concrete lineaments of ordinary human moral life. They give weight
to the fact that crucial points of his arguments draw support, not from an
abstract reading of rationality, but from direct appeal to such things as
6. For example, Sharon ANDERSON GoLD, Unnecessary Evil, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2001; Patrick FRIERSON, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's
Moral Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Jeanine GRENBERG,
Kantian Humility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Susan NEIMAN, Evil in
Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 2002; The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant, New York, Oxford University Press,
1994; Robert LoUDEN, Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, New
York, Oxford University Press, 2000; G. Felicitas MUNZEL, Kant's Conception of Moral
Character, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1999; Philip J. ROSSI, The Social
Authority ofReason, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2005; Holly L. WILSON,
Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2006.
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"the common idea of duty and moral laws", "natural sound understanding", "the common human reason", and "the moral cognition of common human reason "7. These discussions of moral agency are marked by
a deep respect for the humanity in every individual, whatever his or her
status or condition in society, that originated in Kant's reading of
Rousseau 8 • In the context of Kant's critical philosophy, they provide one
marker of that project's fundamental concern, not with an abstract form
of reason, but with reason in the concrete form it takes in a humanity
embodied in conditions of spatio-temporal finitude. On these more
recent accounts, the critical project is thoroughly anthropological, concerned with the unique position human beings occupy in the cosmos as
the juncture of nature and freedom and with the vocation of humanity to
bring about, in a manner appropriate to the exercise of finite reason, the
conditions under which freedom and nature may work together for the
attainment of "the highest good".
The attention paid by this scholarship to the dimensions of human situatedness to which Kant attends in constructing his critical philosophy
may then be further sharpened by placing it under the lens that contemporary intellectual discourse provides by its emphasis on notions such as
"context", "particularity", "otherness", and "difference" in its readings
of humanity's conditions and prospects. Under the interrogation of postmodem questions, the paradigmatically modem texts of Kant's critical
philosophy may yield, at least in some instances, surprisingly post-modem responses 9• To the extent that these re-readings of Kant have
emerged in terms of elements often resonant with key markers of a
"post-modem" intellectual sensibility, this first consideration thus
stands coordinate with a second one, which also underlies the effort of
this essay to bring Kant's philosophical anthropology to bear upon the
theological discourse of grace. This second consideration arises from
what I will propose as an interpretive trajectory on which the work of
Charles Taylor, Susan Neiman, and George Steiner, variously converge
as each describes our current human situatedness in the aftermath of
7. Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. GREGOR, in Paul GUYERAllen W. WOOD (eds.), Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 44.52.57.58; Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, Konigliche
PreuBichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-,4, pp. 389.397.402.403.
8. Manfred KUEHN, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2001, pp. 131-132.
9. A prime example of this may be found in NEIMAN, Evil (n. 6), in which Kant's
understanding of the function of hope in the conditions of human finitude is crucial for
resisting evil in a post-Auschwitz world.
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modernitylO. This convergence emerges as they plot the course of the
deep fissures that now lie athwart the terrain of human meaning, even as
they also note how various efforts to traverse this terrain have disclosed
the fragility of the resources we have as human to see us through safely.
These tropes of "fracture" and "fragility" will thus provide a yoke by
which I propose to link this interpretive trajectory upon our post-modem
human situatedness to a re-reading of a Kantian anthropology of finite
freedom. This link consists in the different yet complementary ways
each trope exhibits how our current situatedness, precisely in confronting us with the radically fractured fragility of our freedom, invites
us - and perhaps even requires us - to re-think how our humanness
stands in relation to the outpouring of divine freedom that Christian theological traditions have sought to articulate in terms of concepts of
"grace"ll.
II.

FRACTURED HORIZONS, FRAOMENfED TERRAIN

Some of the recent re-readings of Kant - including those operative in
the work of Taylor and Neiman - suggest that we may more readily take
an initial sighting upon the key markers of a Kantian anthropology of the
fragility of situated freedom from the perspective of the fractured terrain
of the modernity subsequent to Kant, rather than from the perspective of
what was once perceived as the unbroken intellectual landscape of his
"Age of Enlightenment". Our own fractured cultural circumstances have
brought to our attention how a variety of social, intellectual, economic
and political dynamics functioned as tectonic forces shaping the landscape of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into a far more variegated and unstable terrain than what we had formerly glimpsed as an
unbroken vista of "The" Enlightenment. I thus propose to open the case
for re-reading Kant's anthropology as a resource for a theology of grace
with an account of the interpretive trajectory that maps our contemporary human situatedness onto terrains of "fractured meaning". Taylor,
Neiman, and Steiner will serve as principal guides upon these terrains
10. Such convergence is not limited to the work of these three. I believe that a case
can be made that, among others, the work of philosophers such as Iris Murdoch, Louis
Dupre, and D.Z. Phillips, theologians such as Michael Buckley and David Tracy, and
intellectual historians such as Martin Jay, contain significant elements also heading
toward such a convergence.
11. It is important to understand that this claim is that notions of "grace" serve as one
reflective theological articulation of divine freedom. They are not the sole theological
locus for such articulation, nor is freedom the only aspect of the divine that such notions
seek to articulate.
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because their sure footedness here seems oriented by markers of the
human that, particularly in the crucial case of the fragility of human freedom, lie close to those that had been staked earlier out by Kant. In addition, they each seem acutely aware - as was Kant - that on these terrains
of fractured meaning, with a fragile freedom as one of our slender
resources for navigation, God and humanity have both been put in question in radical, seemingly unprecedented ways.
The remark from Taylor with which I started this essay occurs in the
concluding chapter of Sources of the Self, titled "The Conflicts of
Modernity". This chapter, concerned with exploring the three "zones"
of conflict that Taylor sees emergent on the moral terrain of modernityl2,
is placed against a background image of "fractured horizons". That
image served as title for an earlier chapter in which Taylor's probing of
the "whole modem development we gesture at with the word 'secularization"'13 disputes accounts that understand the decline of religious
belief and practice in much recent Western culture to be an inevitable
consequence of modernizing institutional changes and/or the rise of science. That chapter sets the stage for a three chapter exposition of Taylor's alternative reading of the conditions that have made unbelief culturally plausible. He articulates this alternative in terms of "two big
constellations of ideas which either immediately or over time have
helped generate forms of unbelief"14. One constellation clusters around
the powers of disengaged human reason; the other around the powers of
human creative imagination. On Taylor's account, the unbelief of the
secular age has emerged insofar as, first, each "constellation" has provided a central focus for construing the powers of the human self emergent in the course of modernity and, second, as each focus has also
gained credibility as a moral source apart from the theistic ground out of
which it historically arose. Both foci are anthropological in that they are
each indexed to a specific human power as it operates in relation to its
particular reflexive construal of nature. One centers upon the powers of
disengaged human reason to exercise control within the domain of an
instrumentalized nature; the other upon "the powers of creative imagination ... [that] links these [powers] to a sense of nature as an inner
moral source" 15. Taylor sees emergent in the tensive interplay of the two
"constellations of ideas" an outcome that has "diversified our moral
12. These "zones" involve conflicts over, respectively "(I) the issue about sources,
(2) the issue about instrumentalism, and (3) the issue about morality" (TAYLOR, Sources
[no I], p. 499).
13. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 309.
14. Ibid., p. 319.
15. Ibid., p. 319.
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sources and added two frontiers of exploration to the original theistic
one: nature and our own powers"l6,
Taylor sees a complicated interplay taking place during the nineteenth
century between the "two big and many-sided cultural transformations,
the Enlightenment and Romanticism with its accompanying expressive
conception of man, [that] have made us what we are"l7. Within this
interplay, Taylor sees an issue emerging "which doesn't have an exact
precedent in earlier times", one that he terms "the issue of self-affirmation"l8. As Taylor probes the newly problematic status of "self-affirmation", two related issues of key import for framing a post-modern theology of grace begin to take shape in the unfolding of his theological
subtext: 1) the possibilities for recognizing and affirming good, both of
ourselves and of nature, as well as 2) our capacities for effecting the
good we affirm.
Taylor's discussion shows marks of the presence of both issues. With
regard to the first, he explicitly places the issue of self-affIrmation
against the horizon of a Christian theology of creation for which "it is
never possible to escape altogether the notion that the creation is ultimately good"l9. He further recognizes that a Christian theological affIrmation of the goodness of creation bears upon the notion of "grace" as
a locus for its articulation both as the gratuity of God that brings created
good to be and as divine empowerment of human capacities to love what
is good. In addition to this explicit indexing to the doctrine of Creation,
Taylor provides a more allusive, but still clearly recognizable linkage
of grace to the doctrine of the Incarnation through his notion of an
"epiphany", i.e., "a manifestation which brings us into the presence of
something which is otherwise inaccessible ... which also defines or completes something, even as it reveals"20. This notion is crucial for moving
the later chapters in Sources toward a construal of grace as empowerment to effect the good that seeing and loving good affirms. It serves
the function - marked out by references to the Johannine texts of the
New Testament - of expressing an interweaving of the activity of God
in Creation with the activity of God in Incarnation. For Taylor, the
"epiphanic", as it functions within what he sees as a distinctively modern sense of expressive "inner depth", provides us with a crucial mode
16. Ibid., p. 390.
17. Ibid., p. 393.
18. Ibid., p. 447.
19. Ibid., p. 448.
20. Ibid., p. 419. See Philip J. ROSSI, Seeing Good in a World of Suffering: Incarnation as God's Transforming Vision (forthcoming).
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of active participation in the "seeing good" of God that is operative in
Creation and in the Incarnation:
Put in yet other tenns, the world's being good may now be seen as not
entirely independent of our seeing it and showing it as good, at least as far
as the world of humans is concemed21 •

Taylor had noted earlier that grace (or a secularized counterpart) plays
an important role in accounts of what makes possible commitment to
"the very stringent demands of universal justice and benevolence"22 that
have become the constitutive goods informing the dominant moral concerns of modernity. That earlier discussion of the power of moral
sources to move us did not explicitly situate its account of that power in
the context of questions about the goodness of creation or about our
capacities to recognize, affIrm, and effect that goodness. This later discussion, however, suggests that a construal of such empowerment that is
appropriate to the aftermath of modernity will need to encompass, as
part of its account of the graced human capacity to affIrm and love good,
a participation in those dimensions of God's creative and incarnately
salvifIc power in which seeing and loving good brings good to be. What
this part of such an account might look like, and why its inclusion may
be useful in a articulating a theology of grace appropriate to the fractured context of post-modem culture, will be the focus of the next, concluding section of this essay.

III.

GOD'S HOSPITALITY UPON FRACTURED HUMAN GROUND:

AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF GRACE FOR OUR TIME

If I have correctly read the theological subtext operative in Taylor's
depiction of the cultures of late modernity, it offers an invitation to
develop specifIcally theological resources to address a multi 7 dimensional crisis endemic to these cultures regarding the nature, scope, and
quality of the articulations and affIrmations of good they allow us to
make - be they affIITOations of the good of the cosmos or of the human
selves dwelling in the cosmos. These resources could function as significant coordinates for the task of articulating the "anthropologies of situated freedom" that Taylor sees providing the conceptual frameworks
through which we might effectively begin to resolve this crisis. More
specifIcally, I fmd Taylor's subtext presenting a challenge to develop, as

21. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 448.
22. Ibid., p. 410.
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a step toward a theological anthropology of situated freedom, a construal
of grace appropriate to the fragmented circumstances of post-modernity.
Such a construal would provide an account of the graced form of human
capacities to affirm and love good that articulates how they participate in
God's creative and incarnate salvific powers in which seeing and loving
good brings good to be in a thoroughly fragmented world.
This fmal section does not pretend to offer a full response to this challenge; it will simply propose two considerations that may be of use in
constructing such an account. The first indicates how reading Kant's
anthropology as an anthropology of the fragility of human freedom
offers a framework for a construal of the human locus for the working of
grace appropriate to post-modern circumstances of fractured meaning.
That locus is the very condition of human fragility in a fractured world.
The second then proposes a particular locus within that fragility that
invites our human freedom to the performance and practice of graced
enactments of the seeing and loving of good that brings good to be in a
form that I believe holds major import for our human engagement with
one another on the fragmented terrain of post-modernity. Our current
human circumstances may offer no more poignant and tragic display of
the impact of the dynamics of fragmentation upon the capacities of our
freedom than the large and small scale uprootings of peoples in consequence of local, regional, and international conflicts, attempted ethnic
cleansing and genocide, in response to which the toleration, let alone the
welcoming of those who leave their native lands - be it unwillingly in
fear for their lives or willingly in hope of better circumstances - is
becoming increasingly constricted out of hesitation and fear in the presence of cultural and religious difference. In consequence, a crucial locus
in which human freedom may be called upon to enact a seeing good that
brings good to be may very well be encompassed in the welcoming comportment of human hospitality. Such hospitality, as enacted risk both of
greeting another's vulnerability out of one's own vulnerability and of the
acceptance of that risk by the one welcomed, exhibits to a fractured
world a concrete fragment of the divine hospitality displayed to us in
Creation and Incarnation: The hospitality in which God makes the fractured world a place for divine welcoming of the human in all its contingency and brokenness.
1. Kant's Anthropology of the Fragility of Human Freedom

Kant's anthropology of the fragility of human freedom marks a major
fault line on the fractured terrain of modernity upon which Taylor's

...
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explorations in Sources of the Self converge with those undertaken by
Susan Neiman in Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of
Philosophy23. This fault-line is one that, as it runs through the self, also
marks a fissuring of the self from both nature and God. Neiman provides
coordinates to locate this fault-line as the fmitude of human freedom
lying athwart the workings of created nature in their radical contingency
with respect to human intents and purposes: "Are our capacities to find
and create meaning in a world adequate to a world that seems determined to thwart them?"24. She suggests that this fissure marks the point
upon which Kant's entire critical enterprise - and with it, his philosophical anthropology - pivots:
Kant offers a metaphysic of permanent rupture. The gap between nature
and freedom, is and ought, conditions all human existence ... Integrity
requires affmning the dissonance and conflict at the heart of experience. It
means recognizing that we are never, metaphysically, at home in the
world25 •

Neiman's attentiveness to the depth to which Kant charted the major
contours of this fissure is particularly instructive for reminding us how
his charting continues to provide definitive markers of the human condition addressed by grace. She and Taylor each understand how Kant's
recognition of the inestimable dignity of the power of human freedom to
effect good is equally a recognition that such power resides in agents
who are profoundly fragile: The human power for bringing good to be
thoroughly pertains to, and is rooted in, the fragmentary, fragile exercise
of a fmite practical reason. With respect to the exercise of that power in
the contemporary context of shattered meanings Neiman adds, "where
so many structures of modem thought have been shattered, whatever
sense we find must be incomplete. Attention to the pieces is now all the
more important" 26. For his part, Taylor clearly recognizes that Kant's
account of autonomy - the self-responsibility of finite human rational
agency - marks a divide from "nature", that, at least with respect to
what has power to move us morally, parallels the Augustinian divide
between "the two loves, the two directions of human motivation"27.
Even the commitment to universal justice that, as a "secularized variant

23. NEIMAN, Evil (n. 6).
24. Ibid., p. 318; see also p. 322: "the drive to seek reason in the world - even,
or especially, at the points where it seems most absent - is as deep a drive as any we
have".
25. Ibid., p. 80.
26. Ibid., p. 326.
27. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 366; cf. ibid., p. 83.
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of agape", eventually comes to empower the higher of these two loves
to "stupendous humanitarian efforts" as modernity has unfolded, rests
upon a Kantian basis, noumenal rational agency, that Taylor tellingly
characterizes as "fragile"28.
To the tropes of fragmentation and fragility, Neiman's marking of the
fault line upon which Kant's account of human freedom functions adds
the poignant one of "homeless" to signal the human condition in a
world in which meaning has been left in fragments. Taylor's marking of
this fault line - which, at least in Kant's own reading, is at once a marker
of a rupture and a juncture deeply bound to our human fmitude 29 employs a trope that may seem gentler than Neiman's "homeless" but
still expresses the same sense that humanity has found itself cast adrift
in the aftermath of modernity: He writes of a "loss of rooted certainty"
that occurs when moral sources not bound to belief in God gain credibility3o. Yet for both Neiman and Taylor, as it was for Kant, this marker
of our human finitude - characterized by Neiman as "the gap between
our purposes and a nature that is indifferent to them leaves the world
with an almost unacceptable structure"31 - however much it stands as a
reminder of being homeless and uncertain on the fractured terrain of
modernity, still does not leave us bereft of all hope for finding a welcome that even will embrace our fragility.

2. Guests to One Another: Grace as Mutual Welcome on Fractured
Ground
Despite the apparent bleakness signaled by the trope of "homeless",
Neiman does not recommend despair as the fitting human response to
the fragmented condition of late modernity. She sees the persistent
inquisitiveness of the child as sign of an unquenchable hope for making
sense of the world that, in formal philosophical terms, is expressed in the
principle of sufficient reason:
The urge to greet every answer with another question is one we fmd in
children not because it's childish but because it's natural... In the child's
refusal to accept a world that makes no sense lies all the hope that ever
makes us start anew 32 •

28. Ibid., p. 367.
29. For an account of Kant's portrayal of the function of fmite human reason as juncture between nature and freedom, see Philip J. ROSSI, The Social Authority of Reason
(n.6).
30. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 312.
31. NEIMAN, Evil (n. 6), p. 75.
32. Ibid., p. 320.
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Neiman's image of the child is a powerful one for capturing the personal and individual dimension of the dynamics of hope that she affirms
as appropriate to a fragmented world. Yet the resources for hope in the
face of such fragmentation are not merely personal and individual. So it
may be that a different image - indeed, one that appropriately stands as
converse to the trope of "homeless" - may better serve to locate a place
within an anthropology of the fragility of freedom from which to articulate a graced empowerment for seeing and loving good that brings good
to be. Such an image plays a central role in George Steiner's account of
the fragmentation of meaning. In face of a recognition similar to that of
Neiman's that we all stand "homeless" on a terrain of fractured meaning, Steiner opens possibilities for seeing and enacting good appropriate
to our circumstances on that terrain by proposing that we need to comport ourselves as "guests to one another"33 in our sojourn on this fractured ground.
Like Neiman and Taylor, Steiner sees the dynamics of modernity and
its aftermath as that of break: and rupture:
It is this break of the covenant between word and world which constitutes
one of the very few genuine revolutions of spirit in Western history, and
which defmes modernity itself34.

In the face of so deep a rupture, he proposes that our engagement with
one another on this fractured terrain requires more than ever before (now
that we are in the "after-word"35) that receptivity of mutually encountered freedom he variously terms "courtesia", "tact of heart", a receptivity he sees exhibited in "the intuition that the true reception of a
guest, of a known stranger in our place of being touches on transcendent
obligations and opportunities"36. Even more pointedly, he has reaffirmed the importance of this fundamental receptivity in the face of the
whole array of dynamics through which human beings in late modernity
have made themselves ever more deeply complicit in systemic refusals
of otherness:

33. Theo HOBSON, On Being a Perfect Guest: The Tablet Interview, in The Tablet 259
(13 August 2(05), p. 15.
34. George STEINER, Real Presences, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1989,
p. 93, author's emphasis.
35. George STEINER, Grammars of Creation, New Haven, cr - London, Yale University
Press, 2001, p. 283; earlier Steiner remarks "I believe this dissociation, this tidal wave
against the word to be more severe and consequential than any other in modernity. Indeed,
it may defme the essence of modernity as that which 'comes after'" (p. 278).
36. STEINER, Real Presences (n. 34), p. 155.
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I believe we must teach other human beings to be guests of each other ...
We must teach people we are guests of life on this crowded, polluted
planet37 •

Steiner's identification of hospitality as a practice central to any adequately human response to the pervasive circumstances of fractured
meaning comports particularly well with the configuration that an
anthropology of the fragility of freedom would take; it also bears at least
faint traces of the considerations that led Kant to propose a "cosmopolitan right to hospitality" as an appropriate articulation of the manner in
which human freedom is to respect the otherness of the stranger who
comes to visit in our midst38 • It is a practice in which we learn how our
human status in the world is marked by mutual vulnerability to one
another - particularly when we meet as strangers to one another. The
recognition of such vulnerability may result in wariness, tempered perhaps by politeness, leading us keep our distance from the stranger. In a
more corrosive form, however, awareness of our vulnerability may
evoke hostility - even to the point of taking "war" as a defining feature
of the condition we expect to pervade some portion of our relations to at
least some of our fellow humans. In contrast, hospitality that is enacted
as a gracious receptivity of the otherness of the stranger, is far more than
a wary politeness that allows us to mark a barrier between "us" and
"them" that is transgressed at peril. It is the enacted risk of greeting
another's vulnerability out of our own - and the acceptance of that
enacted risk by the one welcomed - that allows each of us to stand upon
a new space of respect that issues from a mutual recognition of vulnerability.
The mutual recognition suggested here - that we stand both as
"homeless" and yet as "guests to one another" on the fractured terrain
of modernity - is one that I believe has an important role to play in the
construction of an anthropology of the fragility of human freedom and,
a fortiori, in a account of graced human empowerment to see, love, and
bring good to be in our broken world. Central to this anthropology is a
capacity for human freedom to enact in and through hospitality (or, to
use Steiner's term, in its "courtesy") a "seeing good" informed by the
37. HOBSON, On Being a Peifect Guest (n. 33), p. 15.
38. I. KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace, trans. Mary J. GREGOR, in GUYER - WOOD,
Practical Philosophy (n. 7), pp. 328-31; Zum ewigen Frieden, in Kants Gesammelte
Schriften (n. 7), 8, pp. 357-360; The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy
(n. 7), pp. 489-490; Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften (n. 7), 6,
pp. 352-353. See Philip J. ROSSI, Cosmopolitanism and the Interests of Reason: A Social
Framework for Human Action in History, in Proceedings of the x International Kant
Congress, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter (forthcoming).
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graciousness of an incarnate God whose sojourn with us has made it
possible for even such fractured ground to be made into a place of welcome. An apt starting place for theological reflection on hospitality as
locus for the enactment of a seeing good that brings good to be might
very well be - for lack of a more felicitous phrase - the "underside" of
God's incarnation into the fractured contingency that constitutes the
dynamics of our human world. That "underside" is the absence of welcome, the unavailability of hospitality, encountered by God's Word
incarnate - an unavailability marked in human terms in Luke's infancy
narrative as "no room at the inn" and in cosmic terms in John's prologue as "his own received him not". Yet this absence, unavailability,
even refusal of welcome is met not by its counterpart, but by its radical
inversion: The ignored, unwelcomed guest becomes the welcomer,
human inhospitality is reciprocated in gracious irony by a divine hospitality in which God makes the fractured world a place for divine welcoming of the human in all its contingency and brokenness.
Recognition that the first hospitality is God's as condition for the possibility for our enactment of mutual welcome as guests to one another on
the fractured terrain we have inherited from modernity is thus recognition that we do so within the ambit of grace. This first hospitality has
welcomed us in all our human fracturedness to the point of making our
fragile humanity God's very place of dwelling; it is thus in God's welcome enacted in the Word creative and incarnate that we are empowered
to welcome each other. To Neiman's trope of "homeless" we can, I
believe, appropriately add that our condition of homelessness in a world
of fractured meaning does not leave us bereft of the gifts and skills of a
hospitality through which the radiance of the divine hospitality that
enables us to welcome each other can be glimpsed39•
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and the participants in the Philosophy of Religion section of the College Theology Society for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.

